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Abstract 
 
This work discusses the determinants of the access to credit for a sample of about 140 
Argentine small and medium firms, based on a unique database gathered by the Union 
Industrial Argentina in 1999. Among other findings, the evidence shows that the 
acceptance of overdraft lines at high interest rates and very short maturity is an 
important factor regarding the probability of getting a bank loan, while the availability 
of collateral does not seem to affect such probability. All in all, the results appear to 
be consistent with a risk taking behavior by banks in their loan policy toward this set 
of firms, an observation seemingly at odds with the conservative strategy that 
presumably banks follow. 
1. Introduction 
 
It is often claimed that small and medium enterprises (SMEs) face serious 
difficulties when trying to access credit markets. However, supporting econometric 
evidence is very scarce (for the U.S., a notorious exception is Petersen and Rajan 
(1994)). In the case of Argentina, no work has yet been produced to address this 
issue.1 This section intends to contribute to this literature by exploiting a unique 
questionnaire and a database assembled by the Unión Industrial Argentina in 1999.  
 
2. Estimation 
 
The central piece of information is a questionnaire on credit operations carried 
out in 1998, and filled out by 665 SMEs (over a total of about 1,000 mailings) from 
different cities and regions of the country during May and June 1999. The sample 
only includes firms with fewer than 230 employees and sales below U$S 42.7 million. 
Although other questions were formulated, the more relevant to this paper are 
summarized in the following table along with the responses given: 
 
TABLE 1 
Responses to the Survey 
 
 
   
Category Number of As a percentage of 
 Observations Total responses 
   
Total responses 665 100.0 
   
Applied and obtain loan 408 60.7 
   
Applied but did not obtain loan 59 8.8 
   
Did not apply 198 29.5 
       High cost of credit 96 14.3 
       High leverage 11 1.6 
       Bank debt is too risky 66 9.8 
       Does not meet bank's  
       Requirements 
73 10.9 
   
   
 
                                                          
1 Recent papers that attack credit-related issues for SMEs in Argentina using the Central Bank and 
focusing on the effect of bank ownership structure in Argentina are Burdisso etal. (2001) and Berger et 
al. (2001). 
 The questionnaire is well-fitted to run a logit regression analysis aimed at 
identifying the determinants of SME access to a credit loan, where the dependent 
variable is a binary one: firms asking and getting credit are assigned a value of 1 and 
0 otherwise. In spite of having 665 responses, the analysis will be limited only to the 
140 firms that provided complete balance sheet information for 1998. 
The explanatory variables to be used are the following: 
(a)Sales: This is a proxy for size. The bigger the firm, the lower the probability 
of default, which in turn is related to higher diversification, availability of collateral, 
or commercial success.  As a result, its expected effect on the probability of obtaining 
credit is positive.  Sales corresponds to total sales between January and December 
1998.2 
(b) Length of lending relationship with the main bank: As demonstrated by 
Rajan (1992) and Petersen y Rajan (1994), among others, a long lending relationship 
reduces the severity of the informational asymmetries experienced by the bank by 
providing it with information on the borrower’s credit history, her account 
movements, and the personal behavior of the firm’s manager. Consequently, the 
expected sign is positive. 
(c) Lending relationship with a mutual bank: Due to its smaller customer base 
and its more personalized approach to clients, mutual banks (bancos cooperativos) are 
likely to be more willing to provide credit to SMEs with good investment 
opportunities. It is measured through a dummy variable, taking the value 1 if the firm 
operates with a mutual bank and 0 otherwise. 
 (d) Use of overdraft: According to the casual observation and the results of 
the questionnaire, many SMEs use these credit lines which, as is well known, are 
short-term, and set at a variable and high interest rate.3 
Its influence is not clear a priori. On the one hand, the higher the interest rate 
and the shorter the maturity, the better equipped the bank is to overcome its 
informational disadvantage –the high interest rate serves to cover the equally high 
                                                          
2 It may be argued that since all the firms in the sample are small, it is not clear that the size effect will 
be relevant in this case. However, it must be taken into account that in the usable sample sales range 
from 0.17 to 27.3 million dollars. 
3 Out of the 665 firms, 241 asked for an overdraft line and 58 accepted it as a condition imposed by the 
bank. As for the sample of 143 firms with complete information, the proportions are similar: 70 asked 
for it and 10 accepted the bank’s proposal. A comment is in order: it is hard to admit that a firm would 
repayment risk and the short term allows the bank to promptly cut credit whenever 
bad news arrives or uses its ability to cancel it as a disciplinary device. But on the 
other hand, a high interest rate exacerbates the emergence of moral hazard inducing 
firms to undertake riskier projects. Furthermore, under a high and variable rate 
arrangement, the firm becomes more vulnerable to adverse shocks. It is measured 
through a dummy variable, taking the value 1 if the firm took an overdraft line (either 
out of its own willingness or owing to the bank’s imposition) and 0 otherwise.  
(e) Expectation of firm’s export growth: The firm’s export performance may 
convey valuable information to the bank: in the first place, it reveals the degree of 
competitiveness in usually aggressive markets; in the second place, it is an indicator 
of productive diversification against domestic shocks. In sum, the probability of 
default is likely to be lower for this segment of firms, provided the bank trusts or 
confirms the firm’s expectation. It is measured through a dummy variable, taking the 
value 1 if the firm declares to be expecting an increase in its exports and 0 otherwise.  
f) Expectation of investment expenditures: The interpretation is similar to the 
previous one, but it is more applicable to nontradable producers. These firms are 
expected to be doing well and then to enjoy better financial access. It is measured 
through a dummy variable, taking the value 1 if the firm declares it is expecting a 
production increase and 0 otherwise.  
 (g) Term of commercial credit provided to clients: Given the high cost of 
external funds for SMEs, both the bank and the firm are aware that few productive 
projects are likely to be financed via bank loans. On the contrary, commercial credit 
to clients is usually pacted at high interest rates, especially when clients are in turn 
SMEs or individual consumers. As measured by the above-mentioned variable,  if the 
firm is actively engaged in this type of commercial credit, then its probability of 
obtaining a loan is expected to be higher.4  
In addition to these variables, the following ones taken from the balance sheet 
will be employed: 
                                                                                                                                                                      
prefer this unfavorable type of credit, so it is likely that most overdraft operations are in one way or 
another induced by the bank. 
4 It must be noted that other variables measuring the role of commercial credit were empirically tested 
(for example, accounts receivable to assets, receivable minus payable to assets, difference between 
term on receivable and on payable), but none of them appeared to have enough explanatory power. 
(h) Return on assets: The higher this variable, the lower the probability of 
default and therefore the higher the probability of obtaining a loan.5  
(i) Availability of fixed assets: Fixed assets can be used as collateral, thereby 
reducing the bank’s potential losses for a given interest rate and discouraging moral 
hazard behavior. It is measured by its ratio to total assets. 
  (j) Liquidity: The ratio cash to total assets has a priori two negative effects on 
the probability of getting a loan. 6 First, the more liquid the assets are, the easier it is 
for the borrower to withdraw the money from the firm when default is imminent. 
Second, possessing high levels of cash may lead the banker to believe the firm intends 
to transfer its own risk to the lender in the event of default.  
(k) Debt over assets: This variable has an ambiguous effect since, although it 
increases the probability of default, it also reveals that prior lenders have found the 
borrower reliable enough. Presumably, the lower the debt ratio, the more likely it is 
for the second effect to prevail.7  
 
Descriptive statistics on most of these variables appear in Table 6:8 
 
TABLE 2 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
 
     
     
Variable Total Applied for 
and 
Applied for 
but did 
Did not 
  obtain loan Not obtain 
loan 
apply 
 n=143 n=92 n=11 n=39 
     
Length of client relationship 19.6 20.3 17.1 18.9 
 12.5 12.3 11.4 13.5 
     
                                                          
5 Empirical work shows that the return on assets tends to reduce the debt-equity ratio. But here we are 
assuming that the decision to take new debt has already been made, so we are trying to unveil the 
factors behind the lender’s decision. Another point here is that the lender makes his decision based on 
the expected value, but we only have the contemporaneous return on assets. Accordingly, we should 
assume that he has perfect foresight.  
6 It is true that liquidity may proxy for high cash flow, but this effect is already captured by the volume 
of sales and the return to assets. 
7 This reasoning suggests that there may be a non-linearity. However, in the actual estimations, the 
square of the debt ratio displayed a negative but non-significant coefficient. 
8 For comparison purposes, note that the average debt ratio is much lower than in the case of the big 
firms, as shown in the Introduction. This, along with the high cost of overdraft, reveals in a first 
approximation that SMEs are relatively more financially constrained. 
Age  33.0 31.1 25.7 38.9 
 19.8 15.1 10.7 28.6 
     
Return on assets 8.0 9.7 5.0 5.1 
 17.2 10.7 11.0 27.8 
     
Cash/Total Assets 10.3 8.7 7.4 14.9 
 10.0 8.1 9.2 12.8 
     
Sales (million of pesos) 3.9 4.2 3.7 3.0 
 4.2 4.6 2.9 3.4 
     
Fixed Assets / Assets 31.2 31.0 36.4 30.8 
 19.3 17.3 23.6 22.4 
     
Debt / Assets 13.3 16.9 15.0 4.5 
 26.2 30.9 14.8 10.1 
     
Overdraft monthly cost 2.5    
(n=69) 1.1    
     
Note: for each variable, the first column represents the average and the second the 
standard deviation. 
 
As a first approximation, the dependent variable should include only the firms 
that have applied for a loan, but not those that have decided not to do it. Otherwise, 
supply and demand factors would not be clearly distinguished. However, this 
approach may be misleading once firms in this last group may have decided to stay 
out of the credit market because they anticipate that the bank is likely to reject their 
application. The fact that just 8.8% of the 665 firms and 7.7% of the 143 ones with 
complete balance sheet information have been rejected indicates that there is some 
auto-selection bias –knowing the financial constraints faced by SMEs, these figures 
appear to be strikingly low. As a matter of fact, as shown in Table 6, firms offer the 
reason or reasons that led them not to apply. But it is unclear that the categories 
included provide a reliable guide as to whether it was a lack of demand for credit or 
just the educated guess that the application (which in itself is costly), would be 
rejected.  
For this reason, besides using the whole sample and the one excluding the 
third group (firms that did not apply at all), a new dependent variable will be tested by 
excluding only the firms with above-average return to assets and below-average debt 
to assets ratio. This procedure tries to unveil the revealed preference of the firms: 
Since highly profitable firms are unlikely to be rejected by the bank, the fact that they 
display a low level of debt and refuse to apply for a loan may be suggesting that, 
unlike the other firms, they do not need external funding or prefer to pass up good 
projects instead of resorting to a new loan. In this way, 17 firms out of the 143 have 
been eliminated; for this group, the average return to assets is 23.1% and the debt to 
assets 0.6% (only 4 out of the 17 firms display any debt at all).   
Estimation results are presented in Table7: 
 
TABLE 3 
Estimation Results 
 
Dependent variable: Probability of obtaining credit 
Variables   
 (1) (2) (3) 
    
Length of client relationship 0.035 0.026 0.036 
 (1.579) (0.749) (1.297) 
    
Return on assets 0.061 0.087 0.137 
 (2.355) (1.795) (3.143) 
    
Cash/Total Assets -7.655 -4.206 -9.262 
 (-2.109) (-0.696) (-1.942) 
    
Sales (million of pesos) 0.160 0.947 0.715 
 (0.378) (1.135) (1.246) 
    
Fixed Assets / Assets 0.306 1.264 0.781 
 (1.123) (1.257) (1.593) 
    
Client of mutual association 
bank (dummy) 
1.409 1.213 1.244 
 (2.216) (1.240) (1.540) 
    
Debt / Assets 6.606 5.388 5.660 
 (2.528) (1.341) (1.878) 
    
Expectation of export growth 
(dummy) 
1.544 1.141 2.207 
 (1.582) (0.868) (1.519) 
    
Average financing term to 
clients 
0.015 0.016 0.014 
 (2.124) (1.445) (1.761) 
    
Expectation of investment 
growth (dummy) 
-0.989 -0.753 -1.658 
 (-0.962) (-0.678) (-1.366) 
    
Applied for or accepted 
overdraft 
2.048 0.027 1.214 
 (3.816) (0.035) (1.941) 
    
Constant -6.355 -5.493 -7.411 
 (-1.653) (-0.887) (-1.510) 
    
No. de observations 139 95 122 
Chi-square 76.4 12.96 66.53 
p-value 0.000 0.451 0.000 
Seudo R^2 0.418 0.180 0.461 
(1) All observations included 
(2) Firms that did not apply excluded 
(3) Firms with ROA below average and debt over assets above assets excluded 
 
For the previous reasons, we consider that results of regressions (1) and (3) are the 
most reliable. Accordingly, the main lessons drawn from the estimation are: 
• Once other control variables have been taken into account, the firm size does not 
appear to have any significant influence on the probability of obtaining a loan. 
This indicates that no unjustified financial discrimination seems to be taking place 
against SMEs, as often argued in business circles and the press. 
• More profitable firms have a higher probability of obtaining a loan. 
• The higher the liquidity, the lower the probability. A priori, this evidence would 
suggest that there is a chance that the owner may misuse the firm´s funds in a 
financial distress scenario. 
• The higher the debt ratio, the higher the probability. The explanation behind this 
finding is that the prior access to debt conveys positive information to a new 
potential lender. Presumably, this effect would be somewhat neutralized for high 
levels of debt, but in the sample at hand the debt ratio is quite low. 
• The length of the lending relationship also has a positive, but not statistically 
significant, effect on the probability of obtaining a loan. 
• The use of overdraft credit also increases this probability, which would suggest 
that there is no credit rationing à la Stiglitz-Weiss. A plausible explanation is that 
banks take SMEs lending as a high risk/high return investment of their portfolio. 
• Tangibility does not appear to have any significant impact, which would reinforce 
the argument according to which banks are willing to take a risky position when 
making loans to SMEs. 9 
• Expectation of higher investment or exports does not appear to affect the 
probability of getting a loan. It is reasonable to interpret this fact as an indication 
that, given the high cost and short term of credit lines, SMEs use bank loans to 
fund trade credit or unexpected expenses rather than productive assets.  
 
In order to evaluate the actual quantitative impact of the significant variables on the 
probability of obtaining a loan, marginal probabilities were calculated for the 
statistically significant variables, which all seem to exert a noticeable effect on the 
probability under study: 
                                                          
9 The lack of statistical significance of fixed assets does not necessarily imply that the firm does not 
offer collateral, since the owner may use personal assets. But in such a case it would be difficult to 
understand why its borrowing is as scarce and expensive as shown by the results of the survey. 
  
 
Furthermore, Graphs 1 and 2 (based on the whole sample results)  exhibit the changes 
in probability for different values of the return to assets and the ratio debt to assets, 
assessing also the role of overdraft, showing that overdraft becomes more important 
in terms of the probability of getting credit at low levels of profitability and leverage: 
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3. Concluding remarks 
 
Based on a unique information set for the late 90s, this paper provides several insights 
on the determinants of the access to credit on the part of small and medium 
enterprises in Argentina. Some provocative results that deserve further investigation 
are the negative impact of liquidity on the probability of getting credit, the lack of 
statistical significance of asset tangibility, and the effect of overdraft to facilitate the 
external financing of SMEs. Besides its eventual use to design public policies directed 
to this sector, this work might help to grasp a better understanding of bank behavior 
toward this segment of firms. 
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ANNEX: A Simple Model on SME Lending and Bank Behavior 
 
According to the empirical model just developed, banks prefer to lend via overdraft 
facilities at very high interest rates and short term, and do not take into account 
whether the firm has collateralizable assets. These selection criteria suggest that banks 
are not particularly willing to scrutinize and monitor these lenders, or to resort to 
mechanisms to minimize repayment risk.10 In other words, as far as SME lending is 
concerned, banks seem to be willing to take more risks in order to increase their 
expected return. This view partially clashes with the conventional wisdom asserting 
that banks may prefer rationing credit when interest rates go up and adverse selection 
problems are likely to arise.  
In this Section we propose a simple model which helps to rationalize the observed 
behavior of banks. The main insight of this model is that well-diversified banks may 
have no incentives to reduce the risks associated to lending to SMEs. Let us assume 
that banks (or their depositors) are risk-averse and maximize expected utility, lending 
their deposits (normalized to one) to either big or small firms. There is a total of N 
firms, of which Ns= nsN are small and Nb= nbN are big. The return from lending to 
small and big firms is identically and independently distributed with expected value 
sr and br , and variance 
2
sσ  and 
2
bσ , with sr > br  and 
2
sσ  > 
2
bσ . Maximizing the 
bank´s expected utility requires finding the optimal share to invest in small and big 
firms, sθ  and sb θθ −= 1 , respectively. Given the iid property (which makes it 
optimal to lend equal shares in each small firm, 1/Ns, and each big firm, 1/Nb) and 
assuming a quadratic utility function, the objective function is: 
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which yields the following optimal share *sθ : 
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The equation displays the standard result of the portfolio theory. The twist we want to 
introduce is that banks are able to reduce their perceived risk of lending to a small 
firm, 2sσ , by incurring some information costs c that take the form of a lower 
expected return, ( sr - c). These costs include ex ante and ex post assessment and 
monitoring of the firm once standard information (balance sheets, credit history, 
projected cash flows) has been gathered and processed for both small and big firms. 
Given the opacity of small firms (and, in the Argentine case, a high degree of 
informality), it may include periodic meetings with management and employees, 
visits to the plant, and in general a close surveillance of the firm´s activities.  
 
 
                                                          
10 Interviews with market participants confirm these findings. 
 
 
For the purpose of this paper, the relevant question is, how much is the bank willing 
to pay to reduce 2sσ ? For a given 
*
sθ , the required fall in variance for each unit of 
return lost is given by the following derivative: 
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The bank will be less willing to pay for information the higher the number of 
borrowers and the group of small firms (which is a consequence of the higher ability 
to diversify risks both in general and within the latter group), and the lower the risk 
aversion and the portfolio share invested in small firms (in the latter case, because 
portfolio performance is less dependent on the risk and return of such small firms). 
 
This model has a number of interesting and relevant corollaries to interpret the 
empirical findings just presented: 
 
• As far as banks are able to diversify its loan portfolio among a considerable 
number of borrowers, they will have little interest in knowing more about SMEs 
borrowers, because information costs are likely to be high relative to benefits 
(especially when fixed costs are involved). 
• When the portfolio is well-diversified, banks focus on the incremental expected 
return without much consideration to incremental risk (particularly when their 
investment in risky firms is low, as it is often the case). That helps explain why 
banks usually lend to SMEs through overdraft facilities at extremely high interest 
rates and short-term (this latter feature is likely explained by the desire to control 
moral hazard via staged finance). 
• Given the concern for increasing return rather than reducing risk, banks are 
willing to lend to SMEs firms without collateralizable assets, as found in the 
regression. 
